

Peng Ding's Homepage

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I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Statistics, UC Berkeley. I obtained my Ph.D. from the Department of Statistics, Harvard University in May 2015, and worked as a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Epidemiology, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health until December 2015. Previously, I received my B.S. (Mathematics), B.A. (Economics), and M.S. (Statistics) from Peking University.

Research

My research focuses on causal inference including:

- 1. Design and analysis of randomized experiments: randomization tests, covariate adjustment, rerandomization, clustered experiments
- 2. Observational studies: sensitivity analysis for unmeasured confounding, overlap of covariates, integrating multiple data sources
- 3. Natural experiments: instrumental variable, difference-in-difference, regression discontinuity
- 4. Causal mechanisms: treatment effect variation, principal stratification, mediation, interference

I am also fascinated by the following directions:

- 1. Survey sampling
- $2. \ \ Missing \ data: identification \ and \ estimation \ with \ data \ missing \ not \ at \ random$
- 3. Measurement error
- 4. Intersection of Frequentist and Bayesian statistics: Professor Carl Morris called it FB (Morris' football)
- 5. Applied statistics in social sciences and biometrical studies

A First Course in Causal Inference



Causality 国界推動何以成为可能? David Hume

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

David Hume.

Sect. IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding

PART I.

meth, maybe also logic

20. All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That

only causel?

22 All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the realtion of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert

I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact. 1

I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend.

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 $lm(x \sim y)$

?

 $lm(x \sim y)$

?

 $lm(x \sim y)$
 $lm(x \sim y)$
 $lm(y \sim x)$
 $lm(y \sim x + w)$
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 $lm(y \sim x + w)$
 $lm(y \sim x + w)$

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ontwee It ? potential outwers: Yi(1), Yi(0) 笔义图影 Neyman (1923) it z Neyman (1935 TRSS) Rubin (1974) 23 Neyman model Rubin Gusal Model Neymon-Rubin mudel 大门的时 Ti= Yilli - Yilli 平的图果你的 $= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tau_i$ $= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \chi_{i(i)} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \chi_{i(i)}$

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Judea Pearl

exercise

BMIE ##

diet

Experimentalist's view

(Yi(1), Yi(0))

Ziff: Yi(2)

(Yiu) Yi(u)) in 在大阪旅 the fundamental problem of causal intereme 随机化 Fisher Pot the Zi=O Pitan Zi=1 一生党项人参格计

Fisher: randomization as a "reasoned" basis comparable treatment & control 随机任整整" 保证 Fisher Randomination Test A 1442 (FRT) 实验: 灵红的 random per mutation 院机笼袋 $P = \frac{1}{M} \underbrace{\sum_{r=1}^{M} \left(z^{r} z^{r} \right)} > + (z^{r} z^{r})$ FRT $M = \binom{n}{n}$

Fisher:

Design of Experiments
(1935)

Fisherian Principles

_ randomination

___ blocking

_ replication